This isn't really true. Stalin was often described as a quiet listener in collective meetings, and was widely beloved. He developed a cult of personality against his own wishes, due to leading the country successfully during its most chaotic and desparate periods. This happens to all leaders in such situations, FDR was almost revered as a god in the US. Stalin turned down awards like the Hero of the Soviet Union, and refused to change Marxism-Leninism to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, essentially equating his own contributions (particularly on the national question and linguistics) to an extremely minor aspect compared to Marx and Lenin.

Khrushchev, in trying to cement his position, tried to attack each part of Stalin's legacy. His staunch dedication to preparing for World War II, his careful contemplation of the National question as one of the foremost theorists on it within the realm of Marxism, and as someone who detested undue praise. Khrushchev flipped each of these on their heads without base (such as suggesting Stalin planned front line battles on a globe), and instead of killing the cult of personality, turned it into a negative cult of personality and created a total nihilism for the prospects of building socialism. I highly recommend Domenico Losurdo's How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report.

As Weng Weiguang wrote, The Evaluation of Stalin is Essentially an Ideological Struggle. Repudiating Stalin is less about the historical figure and more about what was accomplished during his service. Demonizing Stalin demonizes the soviet union during its major industrialization, and therefore demonizes the most critical era for socialism in advancing on what came before.

In clearing Stalin's name, we clear the record of socialism historically, proving it can, did, and does work definitively. This isn't wasted effort, but is absolutely critical, especially as the demonized visage of Stalin is used as a club to beat Marxists and anti-imperialists in general (even non-Marxists!).

[+] KingGimpicus@sh.itjust.works -11 points 3 hours ago (3 children)

Ah yes, I always forget how the purges were just a big whoopsie doopsie misunderstanding and uncle Joe was actually a stoic, quiet voiced totally not good friend to that big bad Hitler guy.

Thanks for reminding me.

[–] BrainInABox@lemmy.ml 5 points 1 hour ago (1 children)

Twelve year old who just discovered sarcasm

[–] KingGimpicus@sh.itjust.works -3 points 52 minutes ago

Now if only those tankies could read, they'd be real upset about it.

[–] RiverRock@lemmy.ml 8 points 2 hours ago (1 children)

good friend to that big bad Hitler guy.

This is a children's cartoon-ass story that falls apart at the slightest investigation. 80% of dead nazis died on the eastern front.

[–] KingGimpicus@sh.itjust.works -3 points 53 minutes ago (1 children)

Molotov-ribbentrop pact is a fact of history. Not to mention during the war, Stalin himself authorized German u-boats to utilize naval bases around Murmansk to hide between raids against the British. Tell me how Stalin was actually playing 4D chess by allowing Hitler into Soviet naval bases.

[–] Cowbee@lemmy.ml 3 points 48 minutes ago

The communists were never allies with the Nazis. A non-aggression pact is not an alliance. The communists spent the decade prior trying to form an anti-Nazi coalition force, such as the Anglo-French-Soviet Alliance which was pitched by the communists and rejected by the British and French. The communists hated the Nazis from the beginning, as the Nazi party rose to prominence by killing communists and labor organizers, cemented bourgeois rule, and was violently racist and imperialist, while the communists opposed all of that.

When the many talks of alliances with the west all fell short, the Soviets reluctantly agreed to sign a non-agression pact, in order to delay the coming war that everyone knew was happening soon. Throughout the last decade, Britain, France, and other western countries had formed pacts with Nazi Germany, such as the Four-Power Pact, the German-French-Non-Agression Pact, and more. Molotov-Ribbentrop was unique among the non-agression pacts with Nazi Germany in that it was right on the eve of war, and was the first between the USSR and Nazi Germany. It was a last resort, when the west was content from the beginning with working alongside Hitler.

Harry Truman, in 1941 in front of the Senate, stated:

If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances.

Not only that, but it was the Soviet Union that was responsible for 4/5ths of total Nazi deaths, and winning the war against the Nazis. The Soviet Union did not agree to invade Poland with the Nazis, it was about spheres of influence and red lines the Nazis should not cross in Poland. When the USSR went into Poland, it stayed mostly to areas Poland had invaded and annexed a few decades prior. Should the Soviets have let Poland get entirely taken over by the Nazis, standing idle? The West made it clear that they were never going to help anyone against the Nazis until it was their turn to be targeted.

Churchill did not take the Nazis as a serious threat, and was horrified when FDR and Stalin made a joke about executing Nazis. Churchill starved millions to death in India in preventable ways, and had this to say about it:

I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion. The famine was their own fault for breeding like rabbits.

Meanwhile, the soviet famine in the 1930s was the last major famine outside of wartime in the USSR, because collectivized farming achieved food security in a region where famine was common. As a consequence, life expectancy doubled:

The Nazis and soviets were never allies. A non-aggression pact is not an alliance, and the non-aggression pact between the soviets and the Nazis was unique among the other non-aggression pacts in that it was on the eve of war. The soviets knew war was coming, and so bought more time to prepare.

[–] Cowbee@lemmy.ml 12 points 3 hours ago* (last edited 3 hours ago)

The purges were a popularly supported response to genuine threats and infiltration. They were not a misunderstanding, but they did exceed initial expectations, which is why they were stopped. As for Hitler (and the rest of the fascist movement), the Soviets (Stalin included) absolutely despised him. That's why the Soviets spent the 1930s ramping up industrial production as quickly as they could, and trying to form an anti-fascist coalition with the west (which the British and French tanked).

Stalin was said to have "obsessed over quantitative and qualitative" improvements in arms in the years leading up to World War II, and had soldiers stationed on high alert, preparing for a German attack. Despite the insistence of many Generals to muster forces on the German border, it was Stalin's insistence that forces not be so concentrated that prevented the Nazis from totally routing the Red Army, enabling the greatest counteroffensive in history.

Hitler himself was quite honest at times, to himself at least:

How can such a primitive people manage such technical achievements in such a short time!

...

The fact that Stalin has raised the Russian standard of living is unquestionable. People don’t go hungry [at the moment when Operation Barbarossa was launched]. In general, it’s necessary to recognize that they have built factories of similar importance to Hermann Goering Reichswerke where two years ago nothing but unknown villages existed. We come across railway lines that aren’t even marked on our maps.

Statesian journalist and activist Anna Louise Strong actually met and spoke with Stalin, writing down her impressions:

My first impression of him was vaguely disappointing. A stocky figure in a simple suit of khaki color, direct, unassuming, whose first concern was to know whether I understood Russian sufficiently to take part in discussion. Not very imposing for so great a man, I thought. Then we sat down rather casually, and Stalin was not even at the head of the table; Voroshilov was. Stalin took a place where he could see all our faces and started the talk by a pointed question to the man against whom I had complained. After that Stalin seemed to become a sort of background, against which other people’s comments went on. The brilliant wit of Kaganovich, the cheerful chuckle of Voroshilov, the characteristics of the lesser people called to consult, all suddenly stood out. I began to understand them all and like them; I even began to understand the editor against whom I had complained. Suddenly I myself was talking and getting my facts out faster and more clearly than I ever did in my life. People seemed to agree with me. Everything got to the point very fast and smoothly, with Stalin saying less than anyone.

Afterward in thinking it over I realized how Stalin’s genius for listening helped each of us express ourselves and understand the others. I recalled his trick of repeating a word of mine either with questioning intonation or a slight emphasis, which suddenly made me feel I had either not quite seen the point or perhaps had overstated it, and so drove me to make it plainer. I recalled how he had done this to others also. Then I understood that his listening has been a dynamic force.

This listening habit dates back to the early days of his revolutionary career. “I remember him very well from the early days of our Party,” said a veteran Bolshevik to me. “A quiet youth who sat at the edge of the committee, saying almost nothing, but listening very much. Toward the end he would make a few comments, sometimes merely as questions. Gradually we came to see that he always summed up best our joint thinking.” The description will be recognized by anyone who ever met Stalin. In any group he is usually last to express his opinion. He does not want to block the full expression of others, as he might easily do by speaking first. Besides this, he is always learning by listening.

I highly recommended the book Stalin: History and Critique of a Black Legend by legendary communist Domenico Losurdo. Losurdo's unique method in the book is to use near-exclusively western, anti-communist sources, including Goebbels, Hitler, the New York Times, and so forth to examine not just Stalin, but to explain why Stalin is both so hated and yet so loved. It's a critique of the legend surrounding Stalin.