Most certainly not. Stalin wasn't that stupid. He knew war would eventually come, even if he was a bit blindsided because Hitler invaded before winning the battle of Britain. But the Soviets most definitely intended to make use of the pact with Hitler for their own gain, that being the annexation of eastern Poland, Bessarabia, the Baltics and eastern Finland.

The Soviets did not plan on conquesting Poland, they simply stated that Nazi Germany was not allowed to take former Soviet land.

Do you think that the Soviets intended to let eastern Poland in their "sphere" as independent states? Since the protocols specifically leave the independence of any sort of Poland state up for debate later, the Soviets almost certainly intended to annex the land back. This is not exactly a controversial view, historians east and west agree on this reading.

When Poland was invaded by Germany, the state was destroyed, and the Red Army took formerly Lithuanian, Ukrainian, etc areas, sparing them from the Holocaust.

The Soviets killed 100-150k people, deported another 300k to Siberia, and imprisoned half a million people. "Sparing them" has got to be a bit of a joke in this context, especially given that the USSR gave the Nazis carte-blanche to Holocaust away in western Poland. The Holocaust itself only became properly known to the world in 1942 anyway, so it's not like the Soviets used that as their motivation to invade in 1939.

Should the USSR have gone to war with Nazi Germany then and there, with the possibility of the west aiding the Nazis to take out the USSR?

The USSR did not seriously believe that the west would ally with the Nazis against them. It was not a very realistic prospect either, since the west had already conceded quite a few points to the Soviets when they were negotiating the triple alliance regarding mutual defense, and that the west had signed several defense treaties to contain the Soviets specifically. They had not done so for say the Baltics, and even the guarantee for Poland only had provisions for direct action against Germany, not the Soviets. Neither side trusted the other though, and believed the other would try to play them off against the Nazis.

Ultimately it's the same question but posed a bit later than "Should the west have agreed to cede the Sudetenland from the Czechs or gone to war immediately?".

The whole time in the background, Britain and France were attempting to get the Soviets and Nazis to kill each other off.

The Soviets were attempting to let the west and the Nazis fight each other. Potato, potato. Hell, in 1940 Molotov was drinking tea with Hitler in Berlin, trying to get Hitler to give the USSR free reign in Bulgaria and Finland. Hitler meanwhile tried to get the USSR to fight the west over India and Iran. All three camps were consistently trying to get one to fight the other; ultimately the west decided the fight the Nazis first.

Britain warned Germany of an impending soviet attack at the same time they warned Russia of Barbarossa

Do you have a source on a British warning to Germany? I can't find anything mentioning this (not even a disputed claim or something). The British warnings to the USSR were sadly ignored; Stalin did not order the Red Army to get ready for an invasion, which was partially why the first few months of the war went so disastrously poorly for the Soviets.

Nobody could be confused of an actual Soviet-Nazi alliance.

Socialists were. In fact it caused a great rift between the Soviets and the socialists in other countries, since they could not believe that the Soviets would align themselves with the Nazis. Some distanced themselves from it, others realigned (causing a few socialist organisations to be banned for, get this, promoting the Nazis). These were very confusing times for a great many people.

[–] Cowbee@lemmy.ml 3 points 7 hours ago

Regarding Poland, again, this was territory Poland had conquered previously that historically belonged to countries in the Soviet Union. This was a return of territory. By no means did it come without bloodshed, but nevertheless the soviets were not nearly the butchers the Nazis were.

As for the west conspiring to kill of the Soviet Union, and letting Germany do so, again, I gave naked testimony that this was the case. The Soviet Union wanted above all else to survive, the Nazis wanted new colonial territories, and the west wanted to not get colonized by the Nazis while also wanting the Soviets to stop being socialist.

Do you have a source on a British warning to Germany?

Wolkow W. K. (2003), Stalin wollte ein anderes Europa. Moskaus Außenpolitik 1940 bis 1968 und die Folgen, Edition Ost, Berlin, p. 110.

The British warnings to the USSR were sadly ignored; Stalin did not order the Red Army to get ready for an invasion, which was partially why the first few months of the war went so disastrously poorly for the Soviets.

I already explained this earlier. There was a massivedisinformation campaign, with feints from both Germany and the western powers. The first few weeks went as everyone expected, the Nazis advanced quickly over largely open land until running face to face with the full industrialized might of the Red Army. Goebbels' diary is quite telling of the change in attitude. On the 22nd-23rd of June, the Nazis attacked confidently. On July 2nd, Goebbels wrote the following:

Overall, the fighting is hard and stubborn. We can in no way speak of a walk in the park. The red regime has mobilized the people.

July 24th:

We can have no doubt whatsoever about the fact that the Bolshevik regime, which has existed for nearly a quarter of a century, has left a deep mark on the peoples of the Soviet Union […]. It would be right, therefore, if we clearly informed the German people about the harshness of the struggle taking place in the East. The nation must be told that this operation is very difficult, but that we can and will survive it.

August 1st:

At the Führer’s headquarters […] they also openly admit that they were somewhat mistaken in their assessment of Soviet fighting power. The Bolsheviks are showing stronger resistance than we expected, and above all the material means at their disposal are greater than we had anticipated.

August 9th:

Privately, the Führer is very displeased for having allowed himself to be so deceived about the potential of the Bolsheviks by the reports [sent by German agents] coming from the Soviet Union. In particular, the underestimation of the enemy’s tanks and aircraft caused a great deal of trouble for our military operations. He suffers a lot because of this. We’re dealing with a serious crisis […]. The previous campaigns were a walk in the park by comparison […]. The Führer is not worried about the West […]. In our German thoroughness and objectivity we have always overestimated the enemy, except, in this case, the Bolsheviks.

September 16th:

We have totally underestimated the strength of the Bolsheviks.

This was not a walk in the park for the Nazis, because the Soviets planned for it. Modern historiography makes it quite clear that the Nazis and Soviets were never allies in any capacity, for any length of time, and were always conspiring against each other with no expectation of actual peace, just biding their time before what they desired to be a favorable start to war.