Selfhosted

40359 readers

383 users here now

A place to share alternatives to popular online services that can be self-hosted without giving up privacy or locking you into a service you don't control.

Rules:

Be civil: we're here to support and learn from one another. Insults won't be tolerated. Flame wars are frowned upon.
No spam posting.
Posts have to be centered around self-hosting. There are other communities for discussing hardware or home computing. If it's not obvious why your post topic revolves around selfhosting, please include details to make it clear.
Don't duplicate the full text of your blog or github here. Just post the link for folks to click.
Submission headline should match the article title (don’t cherry-pick information from the title to fit your agenda).
No trolling.

Resources:

selfh.st Newsletter and index of selfhosted software and apps
awesome-selfhosted software
awesome-sysadmin resources
Self-Hosted Podcast from Jupiter Broadcasting

Any issues on the community? Report it using the report flag.

Questions? DM the mods!

founded 1 year ago

MODERATORS

HybridSarcasm@lemmy.world

HybridSarcasm@lemmy.hybridsarcasm.xyz

Follow-up question to mounting encrypted drives (lemmy.world)

submitted 11 months ago* (last edited 11 months ago) by MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.world to c/selfhosted@lemmy.world

27 comments fedilink hide all child comments

Hi everyone, I found the great question on booting encrypted drives, and since I'm somewhat paranoid I'd like to ask a follow-up:

When the key to decrypt the drive is input into the system, I'm assuming it stays in the RAM till the time the computer shuts downs. We know that one could, in theory, get a dump of the contents of the RAM in such a state, if done correctly. How would you deal with this problem? Is there some way to insert the USB, decrypt the drive, and then remove the USB and all traces of the key from the system?

Thanks!

Edit: link to the question I referenced: https://feddit.de/post/6735667

you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments

[–] WaterWaiver@aussie.zone 2 points 11 months ago* (last edited 11 months ago) (1 children)

I wouldn't attack via USB, that path has already been too well thought out. I'd go for an interface with some sort of way to get DMA, such as:

PCIE slots including M.2 and external thunderbolt. Some systems might support hotplug and there will surely be some autoloading device drivers that can be abused for DMA (such as a PCIE firewire card?)
Laptop docking connectors (I can't find a public pinout for the one on my Thinkpad, but I assume it'll have something vulnerable/trusted like PCIE)
Firewire (if you're lucky, way too old to be found now)
If you have enough funding: possibly even ones no-one has thought about like displayport + GPU + driver stack. I believe there have been some ethernet interface vulnerabilities previously (or were those just crash/DOS bugs?)

[–] MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.world 1 points 11 months ago

Thank you, I'll need to think more about possible attack vectors