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A place to share alternatives to popular online services that can be self-hosted without giving up privacy or locking you into a service you don't control.
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Absolutely! And it's a great system that I thoroughly recommend. The attack surface is very small but not non-existent. There have been RCE using things like DNS rebinding(CVE-2022-41924) etc. in the past and, although I'm not suggesting that it's in any way vulnerable to that kind of thing now, or that it even affected most users we don't know what will happen in future. Trusting a single point of failure with no defence in depth is not ideal.
I don't really buy this. Certs have been free and easy to deploy for a long time now. It's not much more effort than setting up whatever service you want to run as well as head/tailscale, and whatever other fun services you're running. Especially when stuff like caddy exists.
Yes! Do this if you don't want to get your certs signed for some reason. I'm only advocating against not using certs at all.
No I'm talking about defence in depth. If Tailscale is compromised (or totally bypassed by someone war driving your WiFi or something) then all those services are free to be impersonated by a threat actor pivoting into the local network after an initial compromise. Don't assume that something is perfectly safe just because it's airgapped, let alone available via tunnel.
I feel like it's a bit like leaving all your doors unlocked because there's a big padlock on the fence. If someone has a way to jump the fence or break the lock you don't want them to have free reign after that point.
My claim is that Headscale has a lesser likelihood of compromise than Nextcloud, and that the E2EE provides an encrypted channel between nodes without an immediate need for TLS. Of course TLS over E2EE enhances CIA. There's no pushback to defense in depth here. But in the beginning, the E2EE will get them moving in the right direction.
OP began the post by stating that the login page to a complex PHP web application is internet facing (again, yikes). Given the current implementation, I can only assume that OP is not prepared to deploy a CA, and that the path of least resistance -- and bolstered security -- can be via implementation of HS+TS. They get the benefit of E2EE without the added complexity, for which there is plenty, of a CA until if/when they're ready to take the plunge.
If we're going to take this nonsense all or nothing stance, don't forget to mention that they're doing poorly unless they implement EDR, IDS, TOTP MFA on all services, myriad DNS controls, and full disk encryption. Because those components don't add to the attack surface as well, right?
Totally agree on all points!
My only issue was with the assertion that OP could comfortably do away with the certs/https. They said they were already using certs in the post and I wanted to dispel the idea that they arguably might not need them anymore in favour of just using headscale as though one is a replacement for the other.