You're always subsidizing a company by shopping there though right?
I usually find that the self checkout line moves faster, but choosing a line had always been a guessing game.
Hegar
joined 2 years ago
Still, 60% of consumers said they prefer self-checkout as of 2021
Ah yes, the 'Nightmare' that a clear majority of people prefer.
This is yet more 'wahhhh shoplifting' bullshit from companies whose interests are directly opposed to the interests of their customers.
People want self checkout to be less shit, which it easily could be. In Australia I didn't even have to put things in the bagging area, just scan them. It made the whole process so much smoother.
Ah, thank you.
Kont in Dutch - English's closest major relative - is very interesting.
Presumably it's cognate with cunt, which reminds me of the different meanings of fanny in UK/US English.
Also Finnish and Estonian both with perse - cool, they're both Uralic so that makes sense. And just below them dirsa seems so similar, despite Latvian being Indo-European. But then along comes their Uralic buddy Hungarian with the utterly dissimilar segglyuk.
Hi! If you've used it, there's something I was curious about - how many people's names did it show you?
If 50%+ of the 14000 had the feature enabled, it was showing an average of 500-1000 "relatives". Was that what you saw? What degree of relatedness did they have?
I don't think that opting in changes a company's responsibility to not launch a massive, inevitable data security risk, but tbh I'm less interested in discussing who's to blame than I am in hearing more about your experience using the feature. Thanks in advance!
Killers and beaurcrats are the two sides of the coin of the state.
Laughing a feature that lets an inevitable attack access 500 other people's info for every comprimised account is a glaring security failure.
Accounting for foreseeable risks to users' data is the company's responsibility and they launched a feature that made a massive breach inevitable. It's not the users' fault for opting in to a feature that obviously should never have been launched.
Credential stuffing attacks will always yield results on a single use website because no one changes passwords on a site they don't use anymore.
Launching a feature that enables an inevitable attack to access 500 other people's info is very clearly the fault of the company who launched the feature.
Name, sex and ancestry were sold on the dark web, that's a breach of private data.
The feature that lets a hacker see 500 other people's personal information when they hack an account is obviously a massive security risk. Especially if you run a single use service - no one updates their password on a site they don't use anymore.
Launching the feature in the first place made this inevitable.
It’s actually the user’s fault. The emails and passwords came from a different breach
No, 23andme is very clearly at fault.
Only 0.02% of those who had their personal info leaked were hacked by a credential stuffing attack.
99.8% of victims were victims because the company launched an obviously unsafe feature that allowed intruders to acces 500 other people's details for each compromised account.
No one changes the password on sites they don't use anymore and this is basically a single use service.
users knowingly opted into a feature that had a clear privacy risk.
Your aunt who still insists she's part Cherokee is not as capable of understanding data security risks as the IT department of the multi-million dollar that offered the ludicrously stupid feature in the first place.
People use these sites once right? Who's changing their password on a site they don't log into anymore? Given that credential stuffing was inevitable and foreseeable, the feature is obviously a massive risk that shouldn't have been launched.
Let's not let minor arguments about which is the lesser evil disguise the fact that they are all still evil.