It is your content. But SE specifically only accepts CC licensed content, which makes you right.
gencha
I feel like a lot of people don't understand the most basic things about the site. Any user with enough internet points can see deleted posts.
At least he's passionate about Arch. I don't know his life beyond that. I don't need to know.
Definitely. I can just write a log file myself, change the creation date in the filesystem if I have to. There are websites that generate images of DM conversations on a myriad of platforms online. Manipulation of these artifacts is beyond trivial
I still find it fascinating that you can go to jail because there's an IP address in a log file somewhere or because of a screenshot of a messenger communication.
PathPrefix no longer being regex stood out
Sharing the network space with another container is the way to go IMHO. I use podman and just run the main application in one container, and then another VPN-enabling container in the same pod, which is essentially what you're achieving with with the network_mode: container:foo
directive.
Ideally, exposing ports on the host node is not part of your design, so don't have any --port
directives at all. Your host should allow routing to the hosted containers and, thus, their exposed ports. If you run your workloads in a dedicated network, like 10.0.1.0/24
, then those addresses assigned to your containers need to be addressable. Then you just reach all of their exposed ports directly. Ultimately, you then want to control port exposure through services like firewalld, but that can usually be delayed. Just remember that port forwarding is not a security mechanism, it's a convenience mechanism.
If you want DLNA, forget about running that workload in a "proper" container. For DLNA, you need the ability to open random UDP ports for communication with consuming devices on the LAN. This will always require host networking.
Your DLNA-enabled workloads, like Plex, or Jellyfin, need a host networking container. Your services that require internet privacy, like qBittorrent, need their own, dedicated pod, on a dedicated network, with another container that controls their networking plane to redirect communication to the VPN. Ideally, all your manual configuration then ends up with a directive in the Wireguard config like:
PostUp = ip route add 192.168.1.0/24 via 192.168.19.1 dev eth0
Wireguard will likely, by default, route all traffic through the wg0
device. You just then tell it that the LAN CIDR is reachable through eth0
directly. This enables your communication path to the VPN-secured container after the VPN is up.
How exactly are they poisoning a pool of toxic waste?
Nobody will maintain any builds, because the restrictions are still ludicrous. Most people in the comments are missing the point entirely.
Knowing your gender is highly required? ๐