this post was submitted on 27 Jan 2026
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Bruv, before Signal launched they posted an entire whitepaper detailing their protocol, the working mechanisms of the system, and source code. So to reply to your 3 points:
If you don't understand how any of this works, it's just best not to comment.
What if the malicious actor is not Signal but Google or the hardware manufacturer?
Can we check that the encryption key generated by the device is not stored somewhere on the device? Same for the OS.
Can we check that the app running in memory is the same that is available for reproducible build checks?
Can we check that your and my apps at the moment are the same as the one security researchers tested?
The clients (apps) enforce key symmetry for your own keys, server identity, and the exchanged with the other person part of a conversation. Constantly. There is no way to MITM that.
The clients are open source, and audited regularly, and yes, builds are binary reproduceable and fingerprinted on release.
That's not to say someone can't build a malicious copy that does dumb stuff and put it in your phone to replace the other copy, but the server would catch and reject it if it's fingerprints don't match the previously known good copy, or a public version.
Now you're just coming up with weird things to justify the paranoia. None of this has anything to do with Signal itself, which is as secure as it gets.
Didn't I say that at the start of my questions? What's your point?
If I understand you correctly, you mean that Signal app checks itself and sends the result to the server that can then deny access to it? Is that what Signal does and what makes it difficult to spoof this fingerprint?
I don't think you answered any of my questions though since they weren't about Signal.
I'm just asking questions about security I don't know answers to, I'm not stating that's how things are.
I did answer your questions, but if I missed something, feel free to ask and I can clarify.
Why would any message be plaintext?
Fair you could have just said they have reproducible builds or linked to the docs: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md
Again you are missing the point of the attack
Back at you, even if you are right that signal is secure, the attack is not what you think it is.
What in the world are you talking about here, bud? Your comments are making zero sense.
Look, seriously, if my comment is being upvoted, it's because I responded to yours, and people understand what I am saying in response.
You, unfortunately, clearly do not understand what I'm saying because you do not grasp how any of this works.
Lmao, sure buddy pat yourself on the back because you got upvotes.
You're talking about E2E encryption as if it prevents ~~side-channel~~ client side attacks, but sure morons will upvotes because they also don't understand real world security.
The only useful thing you've pointed out in your deluge of spam, is that Signal builds are reproducible which does protect against the attack described (as long as there isn't a backdoor in the published code)
That's literally what E2E encryption does. In order to attack it from outside you would have to break the encryption itself, and modern encryption is so robust that it would require quantum computing to break, and that capability hasn't been developed yet.
The only reason the other commenter's words sound like spam to you is because you don't understand it, which you plainly reveal when you say "(as long as there isn't a backdoor in the published [audited] code)
E2E encryption doesn't prevent client side attacks, I misspoke when I called it a side channel attack, and ultimately Signal code is audited, so Signal is more secure, but people are mistaking a client-side exploit (sent from Meta's servers to the WhatsApp client) with breaking E2E encryption of whatsapp, which is not what is described in the article.
this isn’t a client-side exploit. this is the fact that meta controls the encryption keys. the mention “widget”, but that’s not a widget on your device; they say it’s a widget on their workstation - whatever that means. i’m thinking it’s something akin to raising a ticket which triggers a workflow to remote install an app on a work device (a process common at large enterprises)
It sounds like you're contradicting yourself now. You're right, signal is more secure because its source code is open-source and auditable. So what's the issue? It seems you've been arguing otherwise, and you're just now coming around to it without admitting that you were wrong in the first place.
The client-side app is also open-source and auditable, and you can monitor outgoing traffic on your devise to see whether the signal app is sending data that it shouldn't. It sounds like people have verified that it doesn't do that, but if you don't want to take their word for it then why don't you see for yourself?
I didn't realize Signal now has reproducible builds (in my defense it didn't when it launched)
This is mostly useless as the traffic signal is sending is encrypted, so you really have to just trust the code.
If it's sending 0.0kb of background data, then the client is not communicating clandestinely with the server.
Sure but it by necessity sends some encrypted data to the server, Wireshark isn't going to tell you if that's just your message or your message and additional information.
Do you know what size channel attacks are? Because nothing you've even tried to bring up describes one at all, or how it applies to your original comments.
Yeah a size channel attack is when a poster can't let go of how small their dick is so talks about how great Signal is all day.
The whole comment thread got a bit "heated".
Not or not only your fault to be clear.. But come on, guys, let's peacefully share arguments, ask question, get answers and learn stuff without insults or 😂-reactions. We can do better. This isn't Reddit.