this post was submitted on 27 Jan 2026
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As evidence, the lawsuit cites unnamed "courageous whistleblowers" who allege that WhatsApp and Meta employees can request to view a user's messages through a simple process, thus bypassing the app's end-to-end encryption. "A worker need only send a 'task' (i.e., request via Meta's internal system) to a Meta engineer with an explanation that they need access to WhatsApp messages for their job," the lawsuit claims. "The Meta engineering team will then grant access -- often without any scrutiny at all -- and the worker's workstation will then have a new window or widget available that can pull up any WhatsApp user's messages based on the user's User ID number, which is unique to a user but identical across all Meta products."

"Once the Meta worker has this access, they can read users' messages by opening the widget; no separate decryption step is required," the 51-page complaint adds. "The WhatsApp messages appear in widgets commingled with widgets containing messages from unencrypted sources. Messages appear almost as soon as they are communicated -- essentially, in real-time. Moreover, access is unlimited in temporal scope, with Meta workers able to access messages from the time users first activated their accounts, including those messages users believe they have deleted." The lawsuit does not provide any technical details to back up the rather sensational claims.

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[–] Rusty@lemmy.ca 58 points 1 day ago (4 children)

If I am not adding my own private key to the app, like in Tox, I don't trust their encryption.

[–] wallabra@lemmy.eco.br 43 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago) (2 children)

Tox also isn't that great security wise. It's hard to beat Signal when it comes to security messengers. And Signal is open source so, if it did anything weird with private keys, everyone would know

[–] Tanoh@lemmy.world -4 points 1 day ago (2 children)

And Signal is open source so, if it did anything weird with private keys, everyone would know

Well, no. At least not by default as you are running a compiled version of it. Someone could inject code you don't know anything about before compilation that for example leaked your keys.

One way to be more confident no one has, would be to have predictable builds that you can recreate and then compare the file fingerprints. But I do not think that is possible, at least on android, as google holds they signature keys to apps.

[–] pressanykeynow@lemmy.world 16 points 1 day ago (1 children)

Signal has reproducible builds and here's the instruction how to check it on Android https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md

[–] Tanoh@lemmy.world 2 points 22 hours ago

If they have, then good. Wasn't sure it was doable with current google's signing process. Highly unlikely someone hasn't tampered with them then (far easier to target the site displaying the "correct" fingerprint).

However, my original point still stands. Just because it is open source doesn't in itself mean that a bad actor can't tamper with it.

[–] MaggiWuerze@feddit.org 6 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago)

Signal is also on F-Droid, so it should be verifiable

[–] derin@lemmy.beru.co 24 points 1 day ago (1 children)

What's stopping the app from keeping your private key and still not encrypting anything?

I'm not trying to be difficult here, I just don't see how anything outside of an application whose source you can check yourself can be trusted.

All applications hosted by other people require you to react positively to "just trust me bro".

[–] GamingChairModel@lemmy.world 2 points 1 day ago

Or, if the app has the private key for decryption for the user to be able to see the messages, what's stopping the app from copying that decrypted text somewhere else?

The thread model isn't usually key management, it's more about the insecure treatment of the decrypted message after decryption.

[–] Candice_the_elephant@lemmy.world 11 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago)

What's to stop an evil company uploading the keys as soon as you enter them in the App? It certainly wouldn't stop Meta.

[–] Pika@sh.itjust.works 2 points 1 day ago

Man, you just brought back memories. I forgot qtox was even a thing. I think I still have my profile saved in my dev folder somewhere for my account