A series of famous present-day landscapes in the US picked from this list rendered in the style of John William Casilear, a 19th-century American landscape painter. They don't look quite like the actual locations -- to do that, I expect that one would probably do better to start with a photograph and do img2img transforms -- though they do get new, interesting landscapes with the feel of them.
Rendered in Stable Diffusion.
These are 2560x1440, aiming for a full-screen image on a 1440p screen, and are probably suitable for use as desktop backgrounds on such screens. If you are viewing these on a desktop in 16:9 aspect ratio (the most-common these days), you can probably benefit from opening the images and viewing them fullscreen. I include a link for each, as the lemmy Web UI doesn't have a great way for a user to view an enlarged inline image (IIRC the kbin Web UI does).
Full size image
Scotts Bluff, by John William Casilear
Steps: 20, Sampler: DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG scale: 7, Seed: 12, Size: 1280x720, Model hash: ebf42d1fae, Model: realmixXL_v15, Denoising strength: 0.7, Hires upscale: 2, Hires steps: 10, Hires upscaler: Latent, Version: v1.7.0-133-gde03882d
Full size image
Three Sisters Springs, by John William Casilear
Steps: 20, Sampler: DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG scale: 7, Seed: 6, Size: 1280x720, Model hash: ebf42d1fae, Model: realmixXL_v15, Denoising strength: 0.7, Hires upscale: 2, Hires steps: 10, Hires upscaler: Latent, Version: v1.7.0-133-gde03882d
Full size image
Kent Falls, by John William Casilear
Steps: 20, Sampler: DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG scale: 7, Seed: 19, Size: 1280x720, Model hash: ebf42d1fae, Model: realmixXL_v15, Denoising strength: 0.7, Hires upscale: 2, Hires steps: 10, Hires upscaler: Latent, Version: v1.7.0-133-gde03882d
Full size image
Avenue of the Giants, by John William Casilear
Steps: 20, Sampler: DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG scale: 7, Seed: 18, Size: 1280x720, Model hash: ebf42d1fae, Model: realmixXL_v15, Denoising strength: 0.7, Hires upscale: 2, Hires steps: 10, Hires upscaler: Latent, Version: v1.7.0-133-gde03882d
Full size image
Buffalo National River, by John William Casilear
Steps: 20, Sampler: DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG scale: 7, Seed: 10, Size: 1280x720, Model hash: ebf42d1fae, Model: realmixXL_v15, Denoising strength: 0.7, Hires upscale: 2, Hires steps: 10, Hires upscaler: Latent, Version: v1.7.0-133-gde03882d
Full size image
Denali, by John William Casilear
Steps: 20, Sampler: DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG scale: 7, Seed: 15, Size: 1280x720, Model hash: ebf42d1fae, Model: realmixXL_v15, Denoising strength: 0.7, Hires upscale: 2, Hires steps: 10, Hires upscaler: Latent, Version: v1.7.0-133-gde03882d
Full size image
Dismals Canyon, by John William Casilear
Steps: 20, Sampler: DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG scale: 7, Seed: 13, Size: 1280x720, Model hash: ebf42d1fae, Model: realmixXL_v15, Denoising strength: 0.7, Hires upscale: 2, Hires steps: 10, Hires upscaler: Latent, Version: v1.7.0-133-gde03882d
Full size image
Santa Elena Canyon, by John William Casilear
Steps: 20, Sampler: DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG scale: 7, Seed: 2, Size: 1280x720, Model hash: ebf42d1fae, Model: realmixXL_v15, Denoising strength: 0.7, Hires upscale: 2, Hires steps: 10, Hires upscaler: Latent, Version: v1.7.0-133-gde03882d
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I usually use the Euler a sampler; I find that the ancestral samplers ("-a") tend to do better on things like fingers (though they have the technical drawback that adding more samples also alters the image; you can't just "converge" on a single image and throw the minimum number of samples required at the problem). For at least these painted landscapes, I didn't seem to have any visible issues using a non-ancestral sampler.
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I tend to render at 1024x1024, the SDXL training resolution; this helps to avoid things like people with extra limbs. For landscapes, this doesn't seem to be an issue for me, and using a different aspect ratio seems to work without flagrant visible issues. My experience is that it can lead to similar elements replicated in an image, but doesn't seem to be a crippling issue for these landscapes.
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One of the largest issues I ran into was reflections in water that didn't quite match the image above the water; I tended to select images without reflections in the water, or at least ones where the issue was less-obvious, though having reflections in water is common in landscape paintings and in Casilear's actual works. My impression is that Stable Diffusion can deal well with situations where a perfect mirror of an image is expected, but not with one that is distorted in various ways -- as is the case for water with ripples.
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I usually post images in PNG format. I use JPEG here; they are less than a tenth the size for images in this style, and I feel like doing PNG for the larger images I'm doing here places unreasonable load on the lemmy host I use, which is -- at no charge -- hosting posted images for users of the server. I wasn't able to see any artifacts in visually-inspecting PNG and JPEG versions.
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I rendered batches of 20, and picked the output that I subjectively felt was most-aesthetically-pleasing.
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Prompts and other information to reproduce the images are included for each.
Yeah, this kinda bothers me with computer security in general. So, the above is really poor design, right? But that emerges from the following:
Writing secure code is hard. Writing bug-free code in general is hard, haven't even solved that one yet, but specifically for security bugs you have someone down the line potentially actively trying to exploit the code.
It's often not very immediately visible to anyone how actually secure code code is. Not to customers, not to people at the company using the code, and sometimes not even to the code's author. It's not even very easy to quantify security -- I mean, there are attempts to do things like security certification of products, but...they're all kind of limited.
Cost -- and thus limitations on time expended and the knowledge base of whoever you have working on the thing -- is always going to be present. That's very much going to be visible to the company. Insecure code is cheaper to write than secure code.
In general, if you can't evaluate something, it's probably not going to be very good, because it won't be taken into account in purchasing decisions. If a consumer buys a car, they can realistically evaluate its 0-60 time or the trunk space it has. But they cannot realistically evaluate how secure the protection of their data is. And it's kinda hard to evaluate how secure code is. Even if you look at a history of exploits (software package X has had more reported security issues than software package Y), different code gets different levels of scrutiny.
You can disincentivize it via market regulation with fines. But that's got its own set of issues, like encouraging companies not to report actual problems, where they can get away with it. And it's not totally clear to me that companies are really able to effectively evaluate the security of the code they have.
And I've not been getting more comfortable with this over time, as compromises have gotten worse and worse.
thinks
Maybe do something like we have with whistleblower rewards.
https://www.whistleblowers.org/whistleblower-protections-and-rewards/
So, okay. Say we set something up where fines for having security flaws exposing certain data or providing access to certain controls exist, and white hat hackers get a mandatory N percent of that fine if they report it to the appropriate government agency. That creates an incentive to have an unaffiliated third party looking for problems. That's a more-antagonistic relationship with the target than normally currently exists -- today, we just expect white hats to report bugs for reputation or maybe, for companies that have it, for a reporting reward. This shifts things so that you have a bunch of people effectively working for the government. But it's also a market-based approach -- the government's just setting incentives.
Because otherwise, you have the incentives set for the company involved not to care all that much, and the hackers out there to go do black hat stuff, things like ransomware and espionage.
I'd imagine that it'd also be possible for an insurance market for covering fines of this sort to show up and for them to develop and mandate their own best practices for customers.
The status quo for computer security is just horrendous, and as more data is logged and computers become increasingly present everywhere, the issue is only going to get worse. If not this, then something else really does need to change.