This is a most excellent place for technology news and articles.
Please, enlighten me how you'd remotely service a few thousand Bitlocker-locked machines, that won't boot far enough to get an internet connection, with non-tech-savvy users behind them. Pray tell what common "basic hygiene" practices would've helped, especially with Crowdstrike reportedly ignoring and bypassing the rollout policies set by their customers.
Not saying the rest of your post is wrong, but this stood out as easily glossed over.
You’d have to have something even lower level like a OOB KVM on every workstation which would be stupid expensive for the ROI, or something at the UEFI layer that could potentially introduce more security holes.
Maybe they should offer a real time patcher for the security vulnerabilities in the OOB KVM, I know a great vulnerability database offered by a company that does this for a lot of systems world wide! /s
.....you don't have OOBM on every single networked device and terminal? Have you never heard of the buddy system?
You should probably start writing up an RFP. I'd suggest you also consider doubling up on the company issued phones per user.
If they already have an ATT phone, get them a Verizon one as well, or vice versa.
At my company we're already way past that. We're actually starting to import workers to provide human OOBM.
You don't answer my call? I'll just text the migrant worker we chained to your leg to flick your ear until you pick up.
Maybe that sounds extreme, but guess who's company wasn't impacted by the Crowdstrike outage.
Was a windows sysadmin for a decade. We had thousands of machines with endpoint management with bitlocker encryption. (I have sincd moved on to more of into cloud kubertlnetes devops) Anything on a remote endpoint doesn't have any basic "hygiene" solution that could remotely fix this mess automatically. I guess Intels bios remote connection (forget the name) could in theory allow at least some poor tech to remote in given there is internet connection and the company paid the xhorbant price.
All that to say, anything with end-user machines that don't allow it to boot is a nightmare. And since bit locker it's even more complicated. (Hope your bitloxker key synced... Lol).
You’re thinking of Intel vPro. I imagine some of the Crowdstrike ~~victims~~ customers have this and a bunch of poor level 1 techs are slowly griding their way through every workstation on their networks. But yeah, OP is deluded and/or very inexperienced if they think this could have been mitigated on workstations through some magical “hygiene”.
A decade ago I worked for a regional chain of gyms with locations in 4 states.
I was in TN. When a system would go down in SC or NC, we originally had three options:
I got sick of this. So I researched options and found an open source software solution called FOG. I ran a server in our office and had little optiplex 160s running a software client that I shipped to each club. Then each machine at each club was configured to PXE boot from the fog client.
The server contained images of every machine we commonly used. I could tell FOG which locations used which models, and it would keep the images cached on the client machines.
If everything was okay, it would chain the boot to the os on the machine. But I could flag a machine for reimage and at next boot, the machine would check in with the local FOG client via PXE and get a complete reimage from premade images on the fog server.
The corporate office was physically connected to one of the clubs, so I trialed the software at our adjacent club, and when it worked great, I rolled it out company wide. It was a massive success.
So yes, I could completely reimage a computer from hundreds of miles away by clicking a few checkboxes on my computer. Since it ran in PXE, the condition of the os didn’t matter at all. It never loaded the os when it was flagged for reimage. It would even join the computer to the domain and set up that locations printers and everything. All I had to tell the low-tech gymbro sales guy on the phone to do was reboot it.
This was free software. It saved us thousands in shipping fees alone. And brought our time to fix down from days to minutes.
There ARE options out there.
This works great for stationary pcs and local servers, does nothing for public internet connected laptops in hands of users.
The only fix here is staggered and tested updates, and apparently this update bypassed even deffered update settings that crowdstrike themselves put into their software.
The only winning move here was to not use crowdstrike.
It also assumes that reimaging is always an option.
Yes, every company should have networked storage enforced specifically for issues like this, so no user data would be lost, but there's often a gap between should and "has been able to find the time and get the required business side buy in to make it happen".
Also, users constantly find new ways to do non-standard, non-supported things with business critical data.
Absolutely. 100%
But don’t let perfect be the enemy of good. A fix that gets you 40% of the way there is still 40% less work you have to do by hand. Not everything has to be a fix for all situations. There’s no such thing as a panacea.
Sure. At the same time one needs to manage resources.
I was all in on laptop deployment automation. It cut down on a lot of human error issues and having inconsistent configuration popping up all the time.
But it needs constant supervision, even if not constant updates. More systems and solutions lead to neglect if not supplied well. So some "would be good to have" systems just never make the cut, because as overachieving I am, I'm also don't want to think everything is taken care of when it clearly isn't.
Separate persistent data and operating system partitions, ensure that every local network has small pxe servers, vpned (wireguard, etc) to a cdn with your base OS deployment images, that validate images based on CA and checksum before delivering, and give every user the ability to pxe boot and redeploy the non-data partition.
Bitlocker keys for the OS partition are irrelevant because nothing of value is stored on the OS partition, and keys for the data partition can be stored and passed via AD after the redeploy. If someone somehow deploys an image that isn't ours, it won't have keys to the data partition because it won't have a trust relationship with AD.
(This is actually what I do at work)
Sounds good, but can you trust an OS partition not to store things in %programdata% etc that should be encrypted?
Separate persistent data and operating system partitions, ensure that every local network has small pxe servers, vpned (wireguard, etc) to a cdn with your base OS deployment images, that validate images based on CA and checksum before delivering, and give every user the ability to pxe boot and redeploy the non-data partition.
At that point why not just redirect the data partition to a network share with local caching? Seems like it would simplify this setup greatly (plus makes enabling shadow copy for all users stupid easy)
Edit to add: I worked at a bank that did this for all of our users and it was extremely convenient for termed employees since we could simply give access to the termed employee's share to their manager and toss a them a shortcut to access said employee's files, so if it turned out Janet had some business critical spreadsheet it was easily accessible even after she was termed
Rollout policies are the answer, and CrowdStrike should be made an example of if they were truly overriding policies set by the customer.
It seems more likely to me that nobody was expecting "fingerprint update" to have the potential to completely brick a device, and so none of the affected IT departments were setting staged rollout policies in the first place. Or if they were, they weren't adequately testing.
Then - after the fact - it's easy to claim that rollout policies were ignored when there's no way to prove it.
If there's some evidence that CS was indeed bypassing policies to force their updates I'll eat the egg on my face.
from what ive read/watched thats the crux of the issue.... did they push a 'content' update, i.e. signatures or did they push a code update.
so you basically had a bunch of companies who absolutely do test all vendor code updates beings slipped a code update they werent aware of being labeled a 'content' update.
You are talking about how to fix the problem.
This person is talking about what caused the problem.
Completely different things.
Analogous to: A house is on fire; call the ambulances to treat any wounded call the fire department, call insurance, figure out temporary housing.
This is basically immediate remedy or mitigation.
Analogous to: Investigate the causes of the fire, suggest various safety regulations on natural gas infrastructure, home appliances, electrical wiring, building material and methods, etc.
This is much more complex and involves systemic change.
bloated IT budgets
Can you point me to one of these companies?
In general IT is run as a “cost center” which means they have to scratch and save everywhere they can. Every IT department I have seen is under staffed and spread too thin. Also, since it is viewed as a cost, getting all teams to sit down and make DR plans (since these involve the entire company, not just IT) is near impossible since “we may spend a lot of time and money on a plan we never need”.
An underlying problem is that legal security is mostly security theatre. Legal security provides legal cover for entities without much actual security.
The point of legal security is not to protect privacy, users, etc., but to protect the liability of legal entities when the inevitable happens.
neglecting the due diligence necessary to ensure those solutions truly fit their needs.
CrowdStrike perfectly met their needs by proving someone else to blame. I don't think anybody is facing any consequences for contracting with CrowdStrike. It's the same deal with Microsoft X 10000000. These bad incentives are the whole point of the system.
The crazy thing is CrowdStrike basically shutdown a ton of really important things and their stock only went down 17%. Like it was a huge blow to the economy for a couple days and somehow investors were like "meh, not that bad"
I don't think anybody is facing any consequences for contracting with CrowdStrike.
This is the myth! As we all know there were very serious consequences as a result of this event. End users, customers, downstream companies, entire governments, etc were all severely impacted and they don't give a shit that it was Crowdstrike's mistake that caused the outages.
From their perspective it was the companies that had the upstream outages that caused the problem. The vendor behind the underlying problem is irrelevant. When your plan is to point the proverbial finger at some 3rd party you chose that finger still--100% always--points to yourself.
When the CEO of Baxter International testified before Congress to try to explain why people died from using tainted Heparin he tried to hand wave it away, "it was the Chinese supplier that caused this!" Did everyone just say, "oh, then that's understandable!" Fuck no.
Baxter chose that Chinese supplier and didn't test their goods. They didn't do due diligence. Baxter International fucked up royally, not the Chinese vendor! The Chinese vendor scammed them for sure but it was Baxter International's responsibility to ensure the drug was, well, the actual drug and not something else or contaminated.
Reference: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Chinese_heparin_adulteration
I would think that a FDA-ban on Chinese pharmaceuticals and an international arrest warrant for the Chinese suppliers C-suite should have been effected.
The fact that the US company CEO was liable and probably didnt spend a single day in a real prison cell is more likely outcome.
Bloated IT budgets?
Where do you work, and are they hiring?
The bloat isn't for workers, otherwise there'd be enough people to go reboot the machines and fix the issue manually in a reasonable amount of time. It's only for executives, managers, and contracts with kickbacks. In fact usually they buy software because it promises to cut the need for people and becomes an excuse for laying off or eliminating new hire positions.
As the post was stating, they get bloated by relying on vendors rather than in-house IT/Security.
My grandfather works IT for my state government tho and it's a pretty good gig according to him
The real problem is the monopolization of IT and the Cloud.
Issue is definitely corporate greed outsourcing issues to a mega monolith IT company.
Most IT departments are idiots now. Even 15 years ago, those were the smartest nerds in most buildings. They had to know how to do it all. Now it's just installing the corporate overlord software and the bullshit spyware. When something goes wrong, you call the vendor's support line. That's not IT, you've just outsourced all your brains to a monolith that can go at any time.
None of my servers running windows went down. None of my infrastructure. None of the infrastructure I manage as side hustles.
Man, as someone who's cross discipline in my former companies, the way people treat It, and the way the company considers IT as an afterthought is just insane. The technical debt is piled high.
I've seen the same thing. IT departments are less and less interested in building and maintaining in-house solutions.
I get why, it requires more time, effort, money, and experienced staff to pay.
But you gain more robust systems when it's done well. Companies want to cut costs everywhere they can, and it's cheaper to just pay an outside company to do XY&Z for you and just hire an MSP to manage your web portals for it, or maybe a 2-3 internal sys admins that are expected to do all that plus level 1 help desk support.
Same thing has happened with end users. We spent so much time trying to make computers "friendly" to people, that we actually just made people computer illiterate.
I find myself in a strange place where I am having to help Boomers, older Gen-X, and Gen-Z with incredibly basic computer functions.
Things like:
It's like only older Millennials and younger gen-X seem to have a general understanding of basic computer usage.
Much of this stuff has been the same for literally 30+ years. The Start menu, folders, voicemail, email, hyperlinks, browser bookmarks, etc. The coat of paint changes every 5-7 years, but almost all the same principles are identical.
Can you imagine people not knowing how to put a car in drive, turn on the windshield wipers, or fill it with petrol, just because every 5-7 years the body style changes a little?
I think it's most likely a little of both. It seems like the fact most systems failed at around the same time suggests that this was the default automatic upgrade /deployment option.
So, for sure the default option should have had upgrades staggered within an organisation. But at the same time organisations should have been ensuring they aren't upgrading everything at once.
As it is, the way the upgrade was deployed made the software a single point of failure that completely negated redundancies and in many cases hobbled disaster recovery plans.
Speaking as someone who manages CrowdStrike in my company, we do stagger updates and turn off all the automatic things we can.
This channel file update wasn’t something we can turn off or control. It’s handled by CrowdStrike themselves, and we confirmed that in discussions with our TAM and account manager at CrowdStrike while we were working on remediation.
That's interesting. We use crowdstrike, but I'm not in IT so don't know about the configuration. Is a channel file, somehow similar to AV definitions? That would make sense, and I guess means this was a bug in the crowdstrike code in parsing the file somehow?
Yes, CrowdStrike says they don’t need to do conventional AV definitions updates, but the channel file updates sure seem similar to me.
The file they pushed out consisted of all zeroes, which somehow corrupted their agent and caused the BSOD. I wasn’t on the meeting where they explained how this happened to my company; I was one of the people woken up to deal with the initial issue, and they explained this later to the rest of my team and our leadership while I was catching up on missed sleep.
I would have expected their agent to ignore invalid updates, which would have prevented this whole thing, but this isn’t the first time I’ve seen examples of bad QA and/or their engineering making assumptions about how things will work. For the amount of money they charge, their product is frustratingly incomplete. And asking them to fix things results in them asking you to submit your request to their Ideas Portal, so the entire world can vote on whether it’s a good idea, and if enough people vote for it they will “consider” doing it. My company spends a fortune on their tool every year, and we haven’t been able to even get them to allow non-case-sensitive searching, or searching for a list of hosts instead of individuals.
I've worked in various and sundry IT jobs for over 35 years. In every job, they paid a lot of lip service and performed a lot box-checking towards cybersecurity, disaster recovery, and business continuity.
But, as important as those things are, they are not profitable in the minds of a board of directors. Nor are they sexy to a sales and marketing team. They get taken for granted as "just getting done behind the scenes".
Meanwhile, everyone's real time, budget, energy, and attention is almost always focused on the next big release, or bug fixes in app code, and/or routine desktop support issues.
It's a huge problem. Unfortunately it's how the moden management "style" and late stage capitalism operates. Make a fuss over these things, and you're flagged as a problem, a human obstacle to be run over.
Yep - it's a CIO/CTO/HR issue.
Those of us designing and managing systems yell till we're blue in the face, and CIO just doesn't listen.
HR is why they use crap like CrowdStrike. The funny thing is, by recording all this stuff, they become legally liable for it. So if an employee intimates they're going to do something illegal, and the company misses is, but it's in the database, they can be held liable in a civil case for not doing something to prevent it.
The huge companies I've worked at were smart enough to not backup any comms besides email. All messaging systems data were ephemeral.
particularly for companies entrusted with vast amounts of sensitive personal information.
I nodded along to most of your comment but this cast a discordant and jarring tone over it. Why particularly those companies? The CrowdStrike failure didn't actually result in sensitive information being deleted or revealed, it just caused computers to shut down entirely. Throwing that in there as an area of particular concern seems clickbaity.
I don't think it's that uncommon an opinion. An even simpler version is the constant repeats over years now of information breaches, often because of inferior protect. As a amateur website creator decades ago I learned that plain text passwords was a big no-no, so how are corporation ITs still doing it? Even the non-tech person on the street rolls their eyes at such news, and yet it continues. CrowdStrike is just a more complicated version of the same thing.
This doesn't seem to be a problem with disaster recovery plans. It is perfectly reasonable for disaster recovery to take several hours, or even days. As far as DR goes, this was easy. It did not generally require rebuilding systems from backups.
In a sane world, no single party would even have the technical capability of causing a global disaster like this. But executives have been tripping over themselves for the past decade to outsource all their shit to centralized third parties so they can lay off expensive IT staff. They have no control over their infrastructure, their data, or, by extension, their business.
Getting production servers back online with a low level fix is pretty straightforward if you have your backup system taking regular snapshots of pet VMs. Just roll back a few hours. Properly managed cattle, just redeploy the OS and reconnect to data. Physical servers of either type you can either restore a backup (potentially with the IPMI integration so it happens automatically), but you might end up taking hours to restore all data, limited by the bandwidth of your giant spinning rust NAS that is cost cut to only sustain a few parallel recoveries. Or you could spend a few hours with your server techs IPMI booting into safe mode, or write a script that sends reboot commands to the IPMI until the host OS pings back.
All that stuff can be added to your DR plan, and many companies now are probably planning for such an event. It's like how the US CDC posted a plan about preparing for the zombie apocalypse to help people think about it, this was a fire drill for a widespread ransomware attack. And we as a world weren't ready. There's options, but they often require humans to be helping it along when it's so widespread.
The stinger of this event is how many workstations were affected in parallel. First, there do not exist good tools to be able to cover a remote access solution at the firmware level capable of executing power controls over the internet. You have options in an office building for workstations onsite, there are a handful of systems that can do this over existing networks, but more are highly hardware vendor dependent.
But do you really want to leave PXE enabled on a workstation that will be brought home and rebooted outside of your physical/electronic perimeter? The last few years have showed us that WFH isn't going away, and those endpoints that exist to roam the world need to be configured in a way that does not leave them easily vulnerable to a low level OS replacement the other 99.99% of the time you aren't getting crypto'd or receive a bad kernel update.
Even if you place trust in your users and don't use a firmware password, do you want an untrained user to be walked blindly over the phone to open the firmware settings, plug into their router's Ethernet port, and add https://winfix.companyname.com as a custom network boot option without accidentally deleting the windows bootloader? Plus, any system that does that type of check automatically at startup makes itself potentially vulnerable to a network-based attack by a threat actor on a low security network (such as the network of an untrusted employee or a device that falls into the wrong hands). I'm not saying such a system is impossible - but it's a super huge target for a threat actor to go after and it needs to be ironclad.
Given all of that, a lot of companies may instead opt that their workstations are cattle, and would simply be re-imaged if they were crypto'd. If all of your data is on the SMB server/OneDrive/Google/Nextcloud/Dropbox/SaaS whatever, and your users are following the rules, you can fix the problem by swapping a user's laptop - just like the data problem from paragraph one. You just have a team scale issue that your IT team doesn't have enough members to handle every user having issues at once.
The reality is there are still going to be applications and use cases that may be critical that don't support that methodology (as we collectively as IT slowly try to deprecate their use), and that is going to throw a Windows-sized monkey wrench into your DR plan. Do you force your uses to use a VDI solution? Those are pretty dang powerful, but as a Parsec user that has operated their computer from several hundred miles away, you can feel when a responsive application isn't responding quite fast enough. That VDI system could be recovered via paragraph 1 and just use Chromebooks (or equivalent) that can self-reimage if needed as the thin clients. But would you rather have annoyed users with a slightly less performant system 99.99% of the time or plan for a widespread issue affecting all system the other 0.01%? You're probably already spending your energy upgrading from legacy apps to make your workstations more like cattle.
All in trying to get at here with this long winded counterpoint - this isn't an easy problem to solve. I'd love to see the day that IT shops are valued enough to get the budget they need informed by the local experts, and I won't deny that "C-suite went to x and came back with a bad idea" exists. In the meantime, I think we're all going to instead be working on ensuring our update policies have better controls on them.
As a closing thought - if you audited a vendor that has a product that could get a system back online into low level recovery after this, would you make a budget request for that product? Or does that create the next CrowdStruckOut event? Do you dual-OS your laptops? How far do you go down the rabbit hole of preparing for the low probability? This is what you have to think about - you have to solve enough problems to get your job done, and not everyone is in an industry regulated to have every problem required to be solved. So you solve what you can by order of probability.
Is there a way to remotely boot into network activated recovery mode? Genuine question, I never looked into it.
